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TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX - CHOICE OF REMEDIES-TAX
CouRT OR DISTRICT COURT-Plaintiff, in 1935, purported to set up a trust
of $300,000 for the benefit of her infant daughter; and thereafter in 1936 paid
the gift tax thereon. 1 She then borrowed from the trustee; (herself and husband) $298,000 of the trust corpus. In 1938 she paid $35,760 interest to the
trustees and attempted to deduct it as an expense. This deduction was disallowed
and the plaintiff then filed in the Tax Court a petition for redetermination on
the ground that the gift tax of 1936 had been erroneously paid and should now
be allowed as a credit against the assessed deficiency which arose because the
commissioner had denied deductibility of the alleged interest payment. The
Tax Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to allow the erroneous tax payment
as a credit. 2 Thereafter, the plaintiff paid the deficiency and brought suit in
the federal district court to recover it. The district court held for the defendant.3
On appeal, held, affirmed. Elbert v. Johnson, (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 164 F. (2d)
421.4
The court held that under the provisions of section 322 ( c) of the Internal
Revenue Code, recourse to the Tax Court after the taxpayer has been notified of
a deficiency precludecL resort to the district court. Section 322 ( c) had its
genesis in section 284 ( d) of the Revenue Act of 1926 5 which was intended
to give finality to decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals,6 and to prohibit all
suits for refunds if the taxpayer had previously petitioned the board.7 The constitutionality of such a provision is not open to serious question, for inasmuch
as the United States cannot be sued without its consent,8 Congress has the power
to prescribe the methods by which refunds and credits shall be made, and also
to limit the right to sue for collection of taxes erroneously paid.9 The courts
have consistently held that this subsection gives the taxpayer two alternatives:
1
In another proceeding involving the wife's income tax for 1936, the board held
that the trust was not a real gift for income tax purposes; that the trust was a sham
and that interest paid on the "loan" was not deductible as an expense. Elbert v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 685 (1941),
2
2 T.C. 892 (1943).
3
Elbert v. Johnson, (D.C. N.Y. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 59.
4
·
Judge L. Hand concurred only in the result. It is quite likely that if the plaintiff had
been in a better position to assert an equity, Judge Hand would have allowed recovery
on the theory of the equitable recoupment doctrine of Bull v. United States, 295 U.S.
247, 55 S.Ct. 695 (1935), noted in IO ST. JoHNS L. REv. 142 (1945).
0
I.R.C., § 322 (c): "Effect of petition to board. If the commissioner has mailed
to the taxpayer a notice of deficiency •.• and if the taxpayer files a petition with the
Board of Tax Appeals within the time prescribed in such subsection, • • • no suit
by the taxpayer for the recovery of any part of such tax shall be instituted in any
court...•" There are several exceptions, none of which affect the case at bar.
6
Section 284 (d), Revenue Act of 1926, H.R. 1, Public No. 20, 69th Cong.,
1st sess., c. 27, 44 Stat. L. 9 (1926).
1 " • • • Finality is the end sought to be obtained by these provisions of the bill,
and the committee is convinced that to allow the reopening of the question of the tax
for the year involved ••• would be highly undesirable." S. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong.,
1st sess., p. 26 (1926). Also see discussion by Senator Reed of Pennsylvania in 67
CoNG. REc. 3528-3529 (1926).
8
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 61 S.Ct. 767 (1941).
9 IO MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 343, §58.44 (1943). But
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(I) he may petition the Board of Tax Appeals before paying the tax, or ( 2) he
may pay the tax and apply to the commissioner for a refund or credit, and if
that is not allowed, he may bring suit in the federal district court to recover the
overpayment. But if he elects the first alternative he is absolutely barred from
recourse to the second.10 This result is not based on a theory of res adjudicata;
rather section 322 ( c) of the code operates as a statute of !imitations 11 which
in effect ousts the jurisdiction of the district courts.12 Thus it is immaterial why
the board dismissed the appeal or whether or not a particular issue was litigated.13 In view of the explicit statutory language and the apparent intent of
Congress the result reached. in the principal case seems sound.
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see Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 51 S.Ct. 186 (1931), where the
court implied that withdrawal of the right to sue for overpayments would subject the
collector to personal liability.
10 IO MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 345, 346, § 58.45 (1943)
and cases collected.
11 Merrill v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 152 F. (2d) 74.
12 Brooks v. Driscoll, (C.C.A. 3d, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 426. But see Ohio Steel
Foundry v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 158, 38 F. (2d) 144 (1930) to the effect that
prior suit in the Court of Claims followed by notice of deficiency and appeal to the
board does not oust the jurisdiction of the court.
13 Worm v. Harrison, (C.C.A., 7th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 977; Moir v. United
States, (C.C.A. 1st, 1945) 149 F. (2d) 455; Bankers' Reserve Life Co. v. United
States, (Ct. Cl. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 1000; Rubel Corp. v. Rasquin, (C.C.A. 2d, 1943)
132 F. (2d) 640; Continental Petroleum Co. v. United States, (C.C.A. 10th, 1936)
87 F. (2d) 91, cert. den., 300 U.S. 679, 57 S.Ct. 670 (1937).

